April 8 - With just under 30 hours until the start of the April 9 rallies in Georgia demanding the resignation of puppet President Mixeil Saakashvili, tensions are running high in the capital city as police prepare for what could turn into another disaster mirroring previous anti-government protests. However, if the opposition wants to succeed in removing Saakashvili, then they need to develop a sound strategy with effective tactis.
Thus far, in a number of interviews with pro-opposition media, opposition leaders have only vaguely outlined the intended strategy for how they plan to force the unpopular president from office. According to Eka Beselia of the Movement for United Georgia (one of the organizations participating in the demonstrations) in an interview with Rezonansi, said the opposition protests will begin sharply at 2 pm local time outside the Parliament building followed by an announcement of an ultimatum to the administration demanding Saakashvili's resignation... or else.
Unfortunately, the "...or else" leaves much to be desired. According to Beselia, if Saakashvili refuses to resign, then the opposition movement will launch "concrete actions, which will be peaceful." The actions Beselia and other opposition leaders have in mind, include picketing government office buildings in the capital and around the country.
Many of the youth groups within the opposition have developed similarly weak and ineffective tactics. The organization known as "Why?" has already staged numerous protests throughout Tbilisi, largely focused on publicity stunts and media-grabbing visuals.
Unless more effective tactics are employed, the opposition movement is likely to fail miserably in its attempt to uproot the Washington's proxy in Tbilisi. The fact that opposition leaders have pledged a commitment to "non-violence," is equally disappointing - as the regime has already demonstrated its willingness to use police and security personnel to violently disperse anti-government protesters in the past.
If anything, removing Saakashvili with violence may be the only alternative, and certainly a justifiable one considering the administration's abysmal failures and misadventures. Furthermore, in the 2003 so-called "Rose Revolution," Saakashvili was brought to power (by way of private, Western financing) as a replacement for an equally corrupt and dismal politician, Eduard Shevardnadze. There's little guarantee that any substitute for Saakashvili would be any more desirable or willing to serve the interests of the Georgian working class.
Instead, the opposition movement itself needs to be reshuffled and transformed into an effective body capable of not only removing this particularly corrupt and inept politician, but radically overthrowing the very system which breeds such louses. Georgia doesn't need another "reformist," it needs a revolution that can put it on the direction towards sustainability, viability and prosperity, as it enjoyed under socialism before the era of Khruschevite revisionism.